We analyze the pass-through of cost changes to retail tariffs in the German electricity market over the 2007-2014 period. We find an average pass-through rate of around 60%. This significantly varies with demand factors: while the pass-through rate to baseline tariffs, where firms have greater market power because customers are less willing to switch, is only 50%, it increases to 70% in the competitive segment of the market. Although the pass-through rate of independent firms is significantly higher than that of other firms in the competitive market segment, the extent of supply-side heterogeneity is limited. Thus, the firms' ability to exercise market power and reduce pass-through appears to be constrained by competition and largely determined by demand side factors. Finally, we find that the pass-through rate in the competitive market segment has been approaching unity over the past years, indicating a rise in competitive pressure.
how changes in main cost drivers -such as network charges, licence fees, and wholesale electricity prices -are transmitted to retail tariffs. We find that the average pass-through is incomplete at around 60%. However, there are some dimensions of heterogeneity. The pass-through rate is lower in market segments where customers face higher switching costs. Baseline tariffs -the tariffs that households automatically get if they are not willing or able to switch retailers -respond less to cost shocks than the least expensive tariffs available, i.e. the competitive segment of the market. However, even in the competitive market segment pass-through is not complete. This might be due to long term supply contracts and some degree of market power by regional retailers.
We also find that the pass-through rate does not strongly depend on the identity of retailers. We contrast large vertically integrated firms, municipal utilities, firms with a mixed ownership structure, and small independent retailers. The independent firms, which we assume to be most competitive, exhibit 15-20% higher pass-through rates in the competitive market segment; the pass-through rates to baseline tariffs do not significantly differ across firms. This indicates that the ability to exercise market power is predominantly determined by demand side factors (consumer search and switching behavior) rather than by supply side factors (scale and vertical integration of retailers).
Moreover, we find a significant degree of time variation in pass-through rates. While pass-through to baseline tariffs remains relatively stable, pass-through to competitive tariffs is relatively low at the beginning of the sample period and increases to almost unity in the 2012-2014 period. It therefore seems that competitive pressure is increasing in the more competitive market segment.
We focus on the retail electricity market in Germany for several reasons. First, retail energy markets, such as electricity and gas, have been in the spotlight in all major developed countries during the last decades, especially in Europe. Yet, in contrast to sectors like telecommunications, the liberalization, privatization, restructuring, and deregulation of energy markets spurred by EU Commission directive do not appear to have been fully successful. 5 While almost all European countries have reached the stated objective of fully liberalized retail markets and entry has occurred on a large scale, direct benefits to consumers in terms of lower prices and better services do not seem to have fully materialized (e.g., Waddams Price (2005) , Joskow et al. (2008) , Su (2015) ).
A second reason to focus on the German retail electricity market is data availability and reach. We are able to match several sources, ultimately creating a rich data-set with precise and high frequency (monthly data for eight years) postal code level information on retail tariffs as well as network charges. Moreover, we have data on wholesale electricity prices 5 See Directive 96/92/EC. from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) -the leading centralized market for electricity located in Germany. These data are not easily available for other countries.
A further advantage of focusing on electricity retail markets is that network charges and wholesale electricity prices account for more than 2/3 of the cost of electricity, while the remaining third comprises mostly taxes and fees (especially renewable surcharges), which can easily be captured by fixed effects. Moreover, most of these cost drivers can be considered to be exogenous to the retailers' pricing decisions. Therefore, we believe we are able to provide unbiased estimates of pass-through rates because we capture a substantial fraction of overall variable costs and can control for most of the unobserved ones.
Finally, electricity markets exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity in market structure both on the supply and on the demand side, which we exploit econometrically. On the supply side, we observe firms of different sizes and ownership structures, pursuing different objectives. On the demand side, consumers differ with respect to their consumption patterns and their willingness or ability to switch suppliers. 6 These dimensions of heterogeneity are key to go beyond the estimation of average pass-through rates and thus help to understand the sources of pass-through.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical framework and summarizes the related literature. Section 3 describes the functioning of the German electricity market. We describe the data in Section 4. Section 5 presents the econometric model, proposes a pricing equation for the German wholesale electricity market and discusses our identification strategy. The results on average and heterogeneous pass-through are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical framework and related literature
The literature on pass-through is quite extensive. The seminal theoretical papers by Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) , further generalized by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) , stress that pass-through rates depend on the extent of market powerboth upstream and downstream -and demand curvatures. Specifically, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that, under imperfect competition, pass-through is not only determined by the elasticities of supply and demand but also by the curvature of demand. They present several models of competition and derive the pass-through rate in each of them. In the 6 Hortaçsu et al. (2017) document robust evidence of consumer inertia in the Texas residential electricity market, due to limited search and strong brand loyalty to the incumbent. Similarly, Gugler et al. (2016) document substantial differences in search intensity among German customers in electricity retail markets. They show that heterogeneous search costs affect prices and find an inverted-U relationship between consumer information and price dispersion. symmetric oligopoly model, the pass-through rate derived from the firms' maximization problem is the following:
where θ is a conjectural variation parameter measuring the intensity of competition (θ = 0 represents perfect competition and θ = 1 monopoly), D , S , θ , and ms measure the elasticity of demand, supply, conduct, and marginal consumers surplus to changes in quantity, respectively. The latter term ms measures the (inverse of the) curvature of demand and it is positive if demand is log-concave as typically assumed in the literature. 7
While the degree of pass-through is ultimately determined by the interaction of these structural parameters, the general intuition is that the transmission of cost shocks to retail prices in oligopolistic markets is incomplete, increases with the degree of competition as well as demand and supply elasticities, and tends to unity in perfectly competitive markets. 8
Several empirical papers confirm that markup adjustments are an important determinant of incomplete pass-through and propose possible mechanisms. Among others, the following explanations are proposed in the industrial organization and trade literatures:
price rigidities (Devereux and Engel, 2002; Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2012; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010) , long-term contracts (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000) , markup adjustments along the supply distribution chain (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000; Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010; Hellerstein and Villas-Boas, 2010) , as well as nonlinear pricing and vertical restraints (Bonnet et al., 2013) . Moreover, recent empirical studies look at the issue of incidence, i.e. how changes in production costs affect consumer versus producer surplus (e.g. De Loecker et al. (2016) and Ganapati et al. (2017) ). They show that relaxing the assumption of complete pass-through in imperfectly competitive markets leads to measuring a significantly lower burden for consumer due to increasing costs than conventional methods would assume.
Most of these studies use structural models to recover mark-ups and pass-through rates and explicitly model the mechanisms that explain incomplete pass-through. The main reason for the use of structural models is that costs are rarely observed by the researcher 7 Ten Kate and Gunner (2005) use a Nash-Cournot oligopoly model and show that, with linear demand and constant marginal cost, the pass-through is independent of price elasticity of demand and that it decreases with competition. 8 The result on convergence depends on the other structural parameters. Specifically, under certain conditions on the curvature of demand, pass-through can be larger than one and convergence to unity can occur from above or below (Miller et al., 2017). and, thus, need to be estimated. Moreover, the estimated parameters can be used to simulate counterfactual policy scenarios. Yet, there is also a growing literature using reduced form approaches, which are particularly useful when a large fraction of costs is observable or when researchers are unwilling to impose a particular structure to the model. 9 For instance, Deltas (2008) studies asymmetric pass-through in the US retail gasoline market and finds that prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than decreases. This asymmetric response, as well as the speed of adjustment, are shown to be a consequence of retail market power. Miller et al. (2017) study the pass-through of industry-wide cost changes to downstream cement prices. In contrast to most other studies, they find that pass-through is more than complete, i.e. it exceeds 100%, and that it is largely unaffected by the degree of competition. By combining their estimates with estimates of other key parameters (demand elasticity and margins) from external sources and using the framework of Weyl and Fabinger (2013) , they then evaluate counterfactual policy scenarios.
While most of these papers focus on markets such as grocery goods, petroleum, cement, or automotive retail, the analysis of energy markets is surprisingly scarce. Few studies look at wholesale electricity prices. For instance, Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen (2008) use time series methods and find that cost pass-through between EU emissions allowances and electricity future prices in Germany is incomplete and asymmetric: positive cost shocks are transmitted more strongly and/or quickly to the final prices than negative cost shocks. Fabra and Reguant (2014) find that emissions costs are almost fully passed through to electricity prices. Their explanation based on a structural model is that firms have weak incentives for markup adjustment due to the very limited elasticity of demand in wholesale electricity markets. The only study we are aware of to examine pass-through to retail tariffs is Mirza and Bergland (2012) , who use time series data to estimate the pass-through of wholesale price changes to variable price contracts in Norway. They estimate a partial adjustment model and find asymmetry in price transmission in the sense that positive price shocks are passed on more quickly than negative ones.
Our study is therefore the first to estimate cost pass-through to electricity retail prices using a large and disaggregated panel dataset including both price and cost data, as well as distinguishing several dimensions of heterogeneity in pass-through rates. This latter contribution is particularly useful as our estimates allow us to better understand the mechanisms behind cost pass-through. 9 While reduced-form approaches can be criticized for delivering potentially biased estimates of pass-through, MacKay et al. (2014) show under which conditions it is possible to obtain consistent estimates.
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The German market is characterized by a vertical structure comprising a generation segment, a wholesale market, and retail markets (see figure 1) . The transmission network ensures that energy generated or imported is delivered to regional supply companies, which then distribute it via low or medium voltage distribution networks to energy retailers and final customers. Finally, a parallel balancing market ensures that the necessary voltage is maintained in the network at any given time.
Insert Figure 1 here
The generation segment in Germany is dominated by three vertically integrated, although legally unbundled, utilities: E.ON, RWE, and Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW).
Moreover, a fourth strong vertically integrated player, the Swedish firm Vattenfall, entered the market in 2002. They jointly meet 2/3 -3/4 of the total German electricity demand.
The remaining German energy needs are covered through local production by a large number of municipal providers, other smaller producers, and imports from abroad. In the wholesale market, most of the electricity generated is either passed on internally to the retail outlets of the vertically integrated producers or sold to other retailers. Since 2002, the German wholesale energy market has been at least partially determined through the EEX located in Leipzig.
Although the percentage of energy trade covered through the EEX has increased, 10 most energy trade between wholesalers and retailers in Germany still occurs through over-thecounter (OTC) long-term bilateral contracts. Yet, the EEX price can be considered a ref- [55-65 per cent] of this market." Although there were some dynamics in the evolution of national market shares of the main players during the 2000s, the overall picture did not substantially change. All big players lost some market share over time, yet they continue to cover almost half of the national market.
This rather aggregated picture is partially misleading. Retail energy markets are regional in scope, at least for what concerns households and small commercial customers.
In its 2009 monitoring report, the German regulator stated: "Geographically, the relevant market for the supply of basic household costumers has to be defined at the level of the coverage area -i.e., the low voltage network necessary to supply [energy]" (Bundesnetzagentur (2009, p. 77-79) ). These regional markets, defined by the coverage areas, differ substantially in terms of market structure, level of competition, and, accordingly, retail prices. In particular, the four big upstream players are also downstream incumbents in many regions. 11
Several of the small vertically integrated providers (particularly the municipal providers) are also incumbents in different regional markets, generally in the municipalities where they operate. Figure 2 represents the geographical dispersion of incumbent types. While municipal utility incumbents (green) are scattered all across Germany, RWE (light blue) is mostly active in the eastern and western parts of the country. EnBW's areas of incumbency (navy) are mostly in the southwest, whereas Vattenfall's activities (orange) are focused on Berlin and Hamburg. E.ON (red) covers large regions of Germany, except in the western part. Finally, areas served by independent providers (gray) and providers with mixed ownership structure (white; typically jointly owned by a big-four firm, and/or municipalities and/or private investors) are scattered across Germany.
Insert Figure 2 here
While several retailers offer different tariffs in each of these regions, incumbent providers are legally obliged to sell energy at a baseline tariff to all household customers who do not explicitly choose another provider. Accordingly, this baseline tariff constitutes an upper bound for the energy retail prices in a given region because it is automatically chosen by customers unwilling or lacking the information to switch supplier. Consequently, incumbent providers have particularly high market power over these customers. Thus, baseline tariffs should also be expected to be less responsive to changes in costs than those offered by the competitive fringe to more informed customers with lower switching costs, represented by the cheapest tariff offered in the market.
11 According to German law, the incumbent is the firm that serves the majority of household costumers in a local market at a given point in time. The incumbent provider is newly defined every three years.
Although German electricity retail markets were liberalized in 1998 -which resulted in substantial new entry -and each retailer has non-discriminatory access to all customers in each regional market, German household customers show a great degree of inertia. The German regulator reports that while customers had, on average, a choice of 97 providers in each regional market in 2013, incumbent providers still served 79 percent of total households in German regional markets in 2014, 34 percent of which were still supplied at the most expensive baseline tariff (Bundesnetzagentur, 2014) . The number of households switching providers has grown at an increasing rate over time, yet incumbent providers have maintained a very strong customer base. In 2014, 3.6 million households switched electricity providers, which accounts for less than 10% of all households in the country.
Retail price structure
The empirical analysis focuses on the evolution of retail prices, in particular on their relationship with wholesale prices and network charges. Retail tariffs entail several components. On the one hand, they are affected by electricity wholesale prices that constitute the main essential input for retailers. On the other hand, they are also strongly influenced by other factors, including the (regulated) cost of transmission and distribution, license fees, as well as taxes and other fees. 12 In its 2012 monitoring report (Bundesnetzagentur (2012)), the German regulator discusses in depth the structure of retail tariffs for household customers, whose national average composition for the 2006-2012 period is reported in figure   3 .
Insert Figure 3 here
These average values are useful for understanding the various components of retail tariffs. However, as discussed above, retail electricity markets are inherently regional, as demand is localized at the level of the distribution network and supply also differs regionally. Therefore, retail tariffs present a lot of cross-sectional variation across, as well as time-series variation within regions. The German regulator reports that the cost of energy purchase varies within different types of firms. Since 2007, entrants achieved, on average, more favorable conditions, mostly because they buy energy from the wholesale markets through shorter-term contracts and wholesale energy prices have decreased. There also 12 One important component of retail electricity prices in Germany are surcharges for renewable energy. Since 2000, the Renewable Energy Sources Act guarantees a regulated feed-in tariff for renewables. This scheme is funded by a surcharge on electricity consumers, which substantially increased over time from 0.78 ct/kWh in 2006 to 6.24 ct/kWh in 2014. This surcharge is nation-wide and is adjusted yearly. It is therefore easy to control for it in our regressions via time fixed effects. appears to be substantial regional variation in electricity purchase and distribution costs varying between less than 7.5 ct/kWh mostly in the north and center-east of Germany to more than 9.5 ct/kWh in Central Germany (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010) . Retail tariffs are further influenced by network charges. On average, these decreased from 7.30 to 5.81 ct/kWh between 2006 and 2010 and then increased again during subsequent years. Even in this case, there is quite substantial regional heterogeneity in the fees' levels. For example, the ratio of the 95 th and the 5 th percentile in the yearly distribution of network charges ranges from 1.62 to 1.96 over the sample period, indicating substantial dispersion. Other costs, such as the license fee, also exhibit significant regional differences, varying by over 75% across different states.
Finally, demand conditions are heterogeneous as well. Consumers' behavior and, especially, their willingness or ability to switch supplier differ across regions. For instance, customers living in urban areas have higher switching rates because they tend to be better informed and face a larger set of available tariffs. Moreover, switching behavior tends to be positively correlated with income, education, and other attributes, while vulnerable customers tend to switch less often (e.g. Waddams Price et al. (2013) , He and Reiner (2015) , and Hortaçsu et al. (2017) ). The heterogeneity in energy purchase costs, network charges and fees, consumer switching behavior, as well the different local competitive conditions described above leads to significant retail price dispersion across local markets and, within them, over time.
The data
The main data source for the analysis is the price comparison site Verivox, which provides highly disaggregated data on energy retail prices, specifically, monthly price data between January 2007 and August 2014 for 8,192 different postal codes (located in 6,205 cities across all 16 German states) from 846 different incumbent providers and 316 different best-price providers. For each postal code and month, we observe prices for three types of household consumption (differentiated by yearly energy consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh) at the incumbent provider's baseline tariff and the overall least expensive offer for that particular regional market. Overall, we have 6 different prices for each postal code and month, which we convert to e/mWh. The data-set thus includes up to~4 million observations. Due to some data limitations for the control variables and the inclusion of lagged values, the actual estimation sample comprises 3,941,340 observations in total and 1,970,670 observations in the two tariff-specific sub-samples.
In Table 1 , we present summary statistics on retail prices in the data-set. Average tariffs substantially vary both within and across consumer groups. The baseline tariff constitutes the highest price in a given market. Therefore, we can infer the lower and upper bound of the distribution of retail prices. These bounds are used to define price dispersion, which we measure as the difference between most and least expensive tariffs in each postal code and period. For example, over the entire sample period, the average lowest price per mWh at 2,800 kWh per year was e188.10, while the average annual baseline tariff was e255.20.
Thus, e67.10 per mWh or more than 25% could have been saved by switching.
Insert Table 1 here
In Table 2 , we report how frequently each firm type is observed as the incumbent retailer and as the retailer with the best tariff. In most German postal codes (58%) the incumbent provider is one of the big-four firms. Municipal providers make up 19% of incumbents, while another 19% have a joint ownership structure. Only 3% of incumbents are independent firms. This picture drastically changes when we instead consider how often each firm offers the lowest tariff: 57% of least expensive tariffs are offered by independent retailers, 22% by the big-four firms -mostly through eprimo GmbH (owned by RWE), 'E wie einfach GmbH' (owned by EON) and Vattenfall-11% by municipal utilities, and 9% by other firms.
Insert Table 2 here
The data on the costs of purchasing and transmitting electricity are obtained from EEX and ene't respectively. The data provider ene't publishes an in-depth database containing the charges for transmitting energy through local German distribution networks. These charges are structured as a two-part tariff: in addition to a yearly base price, energy retailers also pay a variable price for the quantity of energy they transport through the network. We aggregate these network-level data to the level of postal codes and calculate the total cost per mWh of routing energy through distribution networks, depending on the consumption level. 13 The ene't data also include information on the license fees retailers pay to municipalities for the right to install power lines and other infrastructure. To capture energy wholesale prices we employ the Phelix current-price index provided by EEX, that is, the cost of purchasing a mWh of energy deliverable in the current month. 14 We aggregate these cost factors (network charges, license fees, and wholesale energy) into a single 13 The ene't data are recorded at the network level and ene't provides a mapping between networks and postal codes. Networks often serve more than one postal code; conversely, several networks may be present in the same postal code region. We follow the allocation of networks to postal codes proposed by e'net. The mapping seems to work quite accurately as the empirical cost distribution is very similar independently of which level -network or postal code -we look at. 14 All our findings are robust to using month-ahead, quarter-ahead or half-year ahead wholesale prices instead. cost variable, indicating the per-mWh cost of providing energy. Note that while network charges and license fees are postal code-specific, thus varying across regions and time, wholesale prices are uniform across Germany and only vary over time. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of per-mWh-prices for different tariffs and costs over the sample period. The incumbent baseline tariffs (figure 4, panel (a)) increase steadily over the course of seven years from a price of roughly e 180 to around e 270, indicating a price increase of almost 50% on average, with price adjustments happening mostly at the beginning of each year. The 5 th and 95 th percentiles remain close to and stable around the mean, suggesting that price dispersion of baseline tariffs is low and constant.
Plotting the best available energy prices over the sample period ( figure 4, panel (b) ), we find no signs of an increasing trend: the price per mWh mostly remains in a narrow band between e 140 and e 160, with a sharp drop in 2012 that is offset by an increase in 2013.
Finally, looking at the evolution of costs over time (figure 4, panel (c)) we see a significant peak in 2008, while costs mostly remain in the range of e 110 to e 120 per mWh in the years before and after.
Insert Figure 4 here
As discussed above, the heterogeneity in costs, demand, and competitive conditions at the regional level leads to significant retail price dispersion across local markets. Figure 5 shows this geographical dispersion for one specific tariff -baseline tariff for a consumption of 2,800 kWh -for one particular point in time -the year 2010. The different colors represent the quartiles of the price distribution.
Insert Figure 5 here
We observe significant differences in the level of the baseline tariffs across regions. Base- 
Insert Figure 6 here
There is significant price dispersion in each area and significant cross-area differences in the size of this dispersion. It varies between e26 (lowest value of the first quartile) and e103 (highest value of the fourth quartile) by mWh consumed. This is quite substantial given that the average baseline tariff (best) price for consumption of one mWh is around e221 (e149).
Insert Table 3 here
Finally, we employ a large number of control variables at the postal code level, which are also obtained from ene't. These include: the total population, the number of available distribution grids, their total length, the capacity of energy transformers, the total number of household connections (metering points), network losses in percent, cost of network losses in e, as well as total energy transmitted. Table 3 contains summary statistics on network charges, wholesale prices, and the control variables.
Model and estimation equation
The empirical model we apply to the data aims at estimating the pass-through rates of network charges and wholesale prices on retail tariffs, while at the same time controlling for local supply and demand conditions. Like Miller et al. (2017) , we assume that regional providers are free to set retail tariffs according to a pricing function that represents the equilibrium strategy for a given consumer demand schedule in a competitive game. Retail electricity contracts are horizontally differentiated, as each consumer can only purchase energy from the local providers operating in their area of residence. Although electricity is a rather homogeneous good, contracts are perceived by costumer to be vertically differentiated, as the several tariffs of the different retailers in a given regional market are offered under different conditions (length of the contract, conventionally produced or 'green' electricity, bonuses, quality of service, etc.).
The price p i f rct of consuming one mWh of electricity under tariff i (incumbent base, overall best), from firm f (municipal provider, big-four provider, independent provider, other provider) in region r (postal code), at consumption level c (1,500, 2,800 or 4,000 kWh/year) in month t (January 2007 until August 2014) is therefore given by:
where cost rct is the aggregate cost (wholesale energy price, network charges and licence fees) of providing one mWh of electricity in region r for consumption bundle 15 c in month t: cost rct = phelix t + network rct + licence_ f ee rt , where all variables are in e/mWh. The coefficient of the cost variable, ρ, measures the degree to which changes in costs are passed on to retail prices. 16 The matrix of controls X rt accounts for time-varying differences across regions in demand and supply conditions. Specifically, we control for the total population, the total number of household connections, the number of available distribution grids, their total length, the capacity of energy transformers, network losses in percent, cost of network losses in e, as well as total energy transmitted. 17 We also add a large set of fixed-effects. First, we include a full set of 92 month-specific fixed-effects, τ t . Second, we control for firm types φ f -municipal providers, big-four providers, independent providers, and others. Third, we have fixed-effects for the different tariffs' types η i . Fourth, we have three consumption basket dummies, ζ c . Fifth, we control for region-specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity through a set of 8,192 postal code dummies, π r . Finally, we run a specification where the month fixed effects, τ t , are
replaced by month fixed effects at the state-level, τ st . Thus, all 16 German states are allowed to have independent time dynamics through the inclusion of 1,456 dummy variables. The error term, ε irct , is a residual that summarizes unobservable factors. It is assumed to be heteroskedastic and it is allowed to cluster at the level of individual electricity providers. 18 We estimate equation 1 in four different specifications in order to allow for heterogeneity in the pass-through coefficient of aggregate costs ρ. In a first step, we assume that ρ is common to all observations, thus reflecting the average pass-through of costs to retail prices in 15 Network charges entail two components: a yearly fee per user independent of consumption and a variable fee that is function of the consumed electricity. Therefore even though we calculate the network charge per mWh, it differs across consumption bundles. 16 It is not ex ante clear whether cost pass-through should occur instantaneously or with delay. Therefore, we explored using different lags of the cost variable in the regressions. Since our findings remained unchanged, we decided to use same-period costs. Furthermore, pass-through could by asymmetric in the sense that cost increases are passed on to a larger extent or more quickly than cost decreases. We investigated this using an error-correction model similar to the one used by Deltas (2008) and found little to no evidence of asymmetric pass-through in the data. 17 Several of these variables are expected to control for the cost to run the transmission and distribution network. Germany adopted an incentive-based regulation in 2009 under which providers are incentivized to cut costs. Network charges are, therefore, directly related to costs. Hence, the control variables mimic the same factors used by the German regulator to determine the network charges. 18 This level of clustering aims at capturing that many providers -especially the big four -mostly offer tariffs that are homogenous across regions. However, as we discuss above, there are many other providers that are only active in specific regions. Therefore as a robustness check, we clustered the standard errors also at the regional level (postal codes or state-level) to account for these different correlation patterns. Results remain unaffected. the whole sample. Second, we allow the pass-through to differ for the different tariffs ρ i as we expect the tariff types to target different costumer groups in terms of willingness or ability to switch and, hence, capture different competitive segments of the market. Therefore, we run separate regressions for different tariff types i. Third, we estimate firm-type f specific pass-through rates so that we obtain separate pass-through rates for municipal, big-four, independent, and other retailers as well as the different tariff types ρ i f . Finally, we investigate the evolution of the pass-through rate over time by estimating tariff, firm, year-specific pass-through coefficients, ρ i f t .
According to MacKay et al. (2014) , there are two potential sources of bias in the reducedform estimation of pass-through, which we need to address in our setting. First, estimates might be biased if the regression model is misspecified. This misspecification bias arises from the skewness of the cost distribution and occurs if pass-through varies with costs.
This does not seem to be a crucial issue in our case. Our empirical cost distribution is quite symmetric around the mean of 116.8 e/mWh, with a standard deviation of 13.91, a skewness as low as 0.57, and a kurtosis of 3.35. 19 The second type of bias -partial information bias -arises if the unobserved cost components are not independent of the observed ones. In our setting, we measure the main cost components, accounting for more than 2/3 of the cost of providing electricity. The main unobserved cost components are taxes (which vary over time but not across regions) and marketing expenditures (which vary mostly across regions). We believe to be able to control for most unobserved cost components by using large sets of fixed effects as well as including other cost drivers in the regressions. The former would capture time-invariant regional specific differences, while the latter account for time-varying components that are common across regions.
Results
In this section, we discuss the main regression results. Table 4 reports different specifications that focus on the average pass-through of costs to both incumbent tariffs and best tariffs pooled. In the first column, we report the result of a simple linear regression of retail prices on aggregate costs, finding an average pass-through rate of 36%: a e1 reduction in the cost of providing electricity to retail customers -for instance due to a change in the cost of energy or the cost of transmission and distribution -is transformed in a 36 19 Combining the numerical example presented by MacKay et al. (2014) with the moments of our empirical cost distribution, we calculate the potential misspecification bias in our setting to be 2.4% at most. e-cent decrease in costumers' prices, on average. 20 In column (2), we add the matrix of control variables X rt . None of the control variables are significant in this specification and pass-through decreases to 32%. The addition of month fixed-effects in column (3) significantly increases the pass-through rate to 85%. Controlling for firm-and contract types in columns (4) and (5) does not strongly affect cost pass-through. However, controlling for contract type (incumbent or best-price provider) greatly increases the ability of the model to explain variation in the dependent variable. This is due to the large difference in levels between the respective time series and suggests the more disaggregated treatment presented below. Adding fixed-effects for the three different consumption levels (1,500, 2,800, and 4,000 MWh p.a.) sharply decreases pass-through to 56%. Controlling for zip-code specific effects (column 7) and, additionally, swapping month fixed-effects for month-state fixed effects (column 8) does not strongly affect pass-through. In our preferred specification in column (7), we estimate that 59% of costs are passed through to consumer prices.
For the interpretation of this result, it is important to go back to the specifics of the price data. We observe prices posted for new customers, which do not necessarily coincide with actual prices for current customers. Indeed, they can be seen as the best offer that providers are willing to make at each point in time. Thus, posted prices should be expected to adapt more quickly to the evolution of costs and market conditions than existing tariffs. Therefore, we cautiously interpret this estimated pass-through as a sort of upper-bound to the general pass-through in the German energy retail markets.
Insert Table 4 here
We next split the sample according to the two tariff types -'incumbent base' and 'overall best' -thus allowing us to estimate heterogeneous pass-through rates depending on the customer types. As discussed above, these tariffs should reflect different segments of the market. We expect customers who select into the 'best' tariff to be better informed and to have smaller switching costs. Therefore, these tariffs should be more competitive and respond more strongly to changes in costs. Put differently, we expect the elasticity of demand to be higher for these tariffs compared to baseline tariffs. Results are reported in tables 5 and 6. The two specifications without fixed-effects (columns (1) and (2) in table 4) are omitted for brevity.
The pattern of pass-through rates to incumbent base tariffs (table 5) is similar to the one observed in the pooled sample, with the average pass-through rates being lower. In 20 The small amount of variation explained by cost, i.e. the R 2 of only 1.2% is due to the non-homogenous nature of the two tariff types that are pooled here; running the same simple linear regression in the sample of best tariffs results an R 2 of 14%. the most comprehensive specifications (columns (4) and (5)) the rate of cost pass-through amounts to 48 -49%.
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Conversely, pass-through rates appear to be significantly higher in the competitive segment (table 6). The cost coefficient remains large throughout all specifications and indicates that 69-70% of costs are passed through to retail prices in columns (4) and (5). This means that pass-through to competitive tariffs is higher than pass-through to incumbent base tariffs by more than 20%. 21 This is in line with the model by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) summarized in section 2: other things equal, pass-through should increase with elasticity of demand. While our specification captures the variation of baseline tariffs very well (R 2 of up to 97%), it explains the variation of best tariffs to a lesser degree (R 2 of 67-70%). This is because the best tariff changes as the firm at the margin changes and, therefore, is much more dispersed than the incumbent tariff.
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In the next step, we allow the pass-through to vary across firm types in an effort to analyze whether firms differ with respect to downstream market power. We would expect independent providers to have a higher pass-through rate than the 'big four' utilities and, potentially, the municipal providers, because the latter firm types are vertically integrated with an established brand name that may grant them market power. 22 Moreover, independent firms generally buy energy from the wholesale markets through shorter-term contracts (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010) and can therefore more easily adjust their retail prices to changes in the cost of energy. Again, we distinguish between incumbent base tariffs and best available tariffs. Table 7 reports the results on incumbent tariffs.
Insert Table 7 here
The patterns of cost pass-through to the incumbent tariffs of different firm types are similar to those reported in table 5. The pass-through rate of independent firms is higher than that of other firm types in all specifications, although the difference is not always statistically significant: independent firms have a significantly higher pass-through than 21 We also estimated pass-through to incumbent and best tariffs in a pooled regression, finding that the difference between the two is statistically significant. 22 According to Gaudin (2016) the pass-through rate should also be affected by the relative bargaining power between upstream producers and downstream retailers depending on the type agreement they contract upon. municipalities in all specifications but column (3); their pass-through is significantly higher than that of big four firms in columns (3) and (5), but not in the other specifications; finally, there is no significant difference to firms in the 'other' category in any specification. The size of pass-through differences, based on the estimates from columns (4) and (5) of table 7, are modest at <10%.
In the more competitive market segment (table 8), we find that independent firms exhibit the highest degree of pass-through in columns (2) to (5), with rates ranging from 74 to 90%. The differences to other firm types are significant in most cases, with the exceptions of the differences to big four firms in columns (2) and (5). The differences in pass-through rates are also economically significant, although not substantial: based on the estimates from columns (4) and (5), independent firms transmit 12-23% more of cost changes to retail prices than other firms do. Again, these results are consistent with the framework proposed by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) . Assuming that demand elasticities do not vary across firms within a specific market segment (e.g. the competitive tariffs), the differences in pass-through rates between independent operators and big-four incumbents can be rationalized by a larger elasticity of supply for the former. In light of the firm heterogeneities discussed above, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
Insert Table 8 here
To summarize, while we find some evidence for supply side heterogeneity, its extent appears to be limited: the pass-through rate to baseline tariffs is quite similar across firms, the pass-through rate to competitive tariffs is 12-23% higher for independent suppliers. Therefore, the extent of pass-through seems to be mostly driven by demand side factors -i.e., by the inability to switch supplier -rather than the structural characteristics of the providers.
The next dimension of heterogeneity that we exploit in the econometric analysis is time.
In table 9 we report the results of specifications estimating a time-dependent pass-through for the different tariffs. For the 'incumbent base' tariff the pass-through rate does not change strongly and remains in a 42-55% interval over time. Since the average rate estimated in table 5 amounts to 49%, the time heterogeneity of pass-through to incumbent tariffs appears to be limited. In contrast, the best tariff pass-through rate starts out at around 40% at the beginning of the sample period, decreases to 32% in 2009, increases in 2010 and, after a dip in 2011, becomes almost unity for the final years in the sample. Thus, the average pass-through rate to best tariffs of 70% estimated in table 6 hides rich time dynamics: while the pass-through in the competitive segment is 21% higher on average, the time-specific specification reveals that there is little difference in the beginning of the sample period, but that pass-through to best available tariffs is almost twice as high as pass-through to base tariffs in the 2012 -2014 period.
This result is particularly interesting as it suggests that after 2011, the pass-through rate for the most competitive part of the market -the best tariff -is almost complete. In the framework of Weyl and Fabinger (2013) , this is consistent with almost perfect competition in this segment of the market as pass-through tends to unity if competition increases.
Moreover knowing that the average pass-through in the competitive market segment is incomplete (below one) and that pass-through tends to unity in the latest sample year, can also help us identifying the curvature of demand. As pass-through convergence to unity with increasing competition occurs from below, this would indicate that demand is log-concave.
Yet we need to be cautious when interpreting the results on an almost complete passthrough rate. As posted prices -which is what we observe -aim at attracting and poaching new customers, they most likely are less sticky than actual prices and represent the best deal an operators can offer at a given point in time. Thus in each period, we would expect providers to price more aggressively in order to undercut the current best-price provider. This is consistent with the patterns observed in the data: we see frequent changes in the identity of the best-price provider and a large number of different providers across time.
This would explain why we observe increasing and almost complete pass-through for the best tariffs in the latter part of our sample period. It, however, does not mean that pass-through is as high for all customers in this segment of the market. Furthermore, given that this adjustment process should be expected to be more pronounced the more intense competition is, this logic would also explain the differential evolution of pass-through for the baseline tariffs and best tariffs.
Insert Table 9 here
The final step of our empirical analysis is to allow a maximum amount of heterogeneity in pass-through rates, which are estimated to be tariff, firm, and time-specific. Because of the large amount of estimated coefficients, we present the results graphically in figures 7 and 8 for the baseline and best tariffs respectively.
Insert Figure 7 here Insert Figure 8 here
While we see different evolutions of pass-through rates across tariffs, i.e. market segments, as before, we do not find significant differences across firm types. Thus, all types of firms in our data exhibit remarkably similar dynamics in their pass-through behavior over time. While, in most time periods, independent firms tend to exhibit the highest pass-through rates, the margin is not large. Again, these results seem to suggest that passthrough is mostly driven by consumer behavior as represented by the different tariff types rather than by firm characteristics.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the pass-through of cost shocks to household retail electricity tariffs in Germany. We assemble a rich database containing nearly 4 million observations and covering different retail tariffs for three types of household consumption (differentiated by yearly energy consumption: 1,500 kWh, 2,800 kWh, 4,000 kWh) for more than 1,300 firms operating in 8,192 different postal codes between January 2007 and August 2014.
We have precise information on three major cost drivers for electricity retail prices -the regulated network fee, wholesale electricity prices, and license fees -which combined constitute more than two-thirds of the cost of providing electricity to household customers and are able to control for most other cost factors through several time-varying drivers and numerous fixed effects.
We find that pass-through is incomplete and, on average, amounts to around 60%. Yet, we observe several dimensions of heterogeneity that are consistent with theoretical predictions. Pass-through rates respond to different demand and supply elasticities as well as competition levels. They are significantly larger for those segments of the markets where demand is more elastic because consumers have lower switching costs and consider products to be less differentiated, while they are higher in market segments where the opposite is true. The average pass-through of 60% decreases to around 50% for incumbent baseline tariffs and increases to 70% for tariffs targeted at more mobile costumers. Moreover, passthrough rates tend to be larger for independent retailers if compared to typical incumbent retailers such as the municipal providers and the big four firms (E.ON, RWE, EnBW, and Vattenfall). The latter are expected to have more market power because they are larger, vertically integrated, and have more established brand names that might serve as a lock-in device for less mobile costumers. Moreover, they are expected to have lower supply-side elasticity. However, the differences in pass-through rates across firm types appear to be limited and are statistically significant mostly in the competitive market segment.
We also observe quite different time dynamics for the different tariff types. While the pass-through to baseline tariffs remains relatively stable over time, the pass-through rate to the best available tariff increases to almost unity over the same time period. Since 24% of German households have switched to the competitive market segment (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015) , this increase in competition is likely to entail positive and significant welfare effects. The differences across different firm types appear to be limited: while the changes over time are substantial, the pass-through rates of different firm types tend to move in tandem and are not significantly different from each other. Therefore, it appears that the extent of local cost pass-through and, in turn, local market power is predominantly driven by demand side factors, i.e. the ability of consumers to switch electricity provider.
We interpret our results in light of the general framework developed by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) . This is useful as it helps us to better identify which forces are at play, thus explaining the large degree of heterogeneity of pass-through rates. In the context of the German retail market, it appears that demand elasticity is a more important driver of pass-through than supply side elasticity. This has clear policy implications, as it might be possible to affect demand elasticity by creating policies that decrease consumers' inertia by reminding consumers of the benefit of switching suppliers or reducing the incumbents' brand advantage (e.g. Hortaçsu et al. (2017) ). Indeed, these kinds of policies are extensively discussed and implemented in the UK (e.g. Waddams Price et al. (2013) , ?). While we think that our results and their interpretation are useful steps to better understand the functioning of retail electricity markets, there is more that can be done. If we had reliable external estimates for the other fundamental parameters of the model -such as demand elasticity and conduct as in Miller et al. (2017) -we could go one step ahead and use our pass-through estimates to run counterfactual simulations and evaluate policy scenarios.
For instance, we could analyze the effect of changes in the regulated distribution fees or in the energy-related taxes. However, this exceeds the scope of this paper and is left for future research. 
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